The Republic

by Plato · Πολιτεία

Assigned by 8 of the 9 reading lists

Written
c. 375 BCE
Language
Greek
Length
Long · 420 pp300 to 700 pages
Difficulty
Difficult4 of 5 for a first-year reader

We recommendThe Republic of Plato, translated by Allan BloomBasic Books, 2016Literal enough for close reading, with the interpretive essay many programs use.

Also good

  • G. M. A. Grube, revised by C. D. C. Reeve. The standard classroom edition, clear and cheap.
  • Desmond Lee. The easiest prose version, with running summaries for a first pass.

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Socrates, challenged to show that justice is worth having for its own sake and not only for its rewards, proposes to find it first in a city, where it will be written large, and then in the soul. The city he builds in speech has three classes, a guardian class raised in common, philosophers as kings, and an education that begins by censoring Homer. The argument passes through the images of the sun, the divided line and the cave, catalogues four ways a good regime decays into tyranny, and returns in the last book to the question of what a just life is actually worth to the person living it.

Why it's on the list

Almost every later argument about justice, education, censorship, class, gender and the rule of experts is in conversation with this book, usually without knowing it. It is the first work to treat politics and psychology as one subject, on the theory that a city and a soul have the same parts and go wrong in the same ways. It is also the founding document of the claim that knowledge should rule, which is why it gets read equally as the first utopia and the first blueprint for a totalitarian state. Programs put it near the centre of the curriculum because it is unavoidable and because it argues against itself: Socrates says things that cannot all be true at once, and working out which ones Plato means is most of the education.

Key themes

Justice
Justice turns out to be structural rather than behavioural. It is each part of a city or a soul doing its own work and not interfering with the others.
Education
The longest single stretch of the book is a syllabus. Music and gymnastics shape the passions first, and mathematics and dialectic come only after the age of twenty.
Knowledge and truth
Opinion and knowledge have different objects, not just different degrees of confidence. The cave, the sun and the divided line are three attempts at the same distinction.
Power and authority
The philosopher does not want to rule and must be compelled. Plato treats the desire for office as evidence of unfitness for it.
Art and beauty
Poetry is banished twice, in Book 3 for lying about the gods and in Book 10 for feeding the part of us that loves to weep and rage.

Overview

Ten books, one evening, one house in Piraeus. Socrates has gone down to the harbour for a festival and is physically prevented from leaving by a group of young men who want to argue. What begins as a polite question from an old man about whether wealth makes dying easier becomes, over a single night, a complete account of the soul, an educational system, a theory of knowledge, a history of political decline and a judgement on poetry.

Two features of the construction matter from the start. First, it is a dialogue and not a treatise, so every claim comes with a speaker, a mood and an audience. Socrates adjusts his arguments to Glaucon, who is spirited and competitive, and to Adeimantus, who worries about what people will say. Second, the city is explicitly a device. Socrates proposes to look at justice in a city because a city is bigger and the letters will be easier to read. Whether he ever actually recommends building it is one of the live questions of the book.

The conversation is narrated by Socrates himself, in the past tense, to an unnamed listener. You are always hearing his version.

The argument

Book 1 works through three definitions and destroys each. Cephalus assumes justice is paying what you owe. Polemarchus makes it helping friends and harming enemies. Thrasymachus makes it the advantage of whoever holds power, and adds that the just man is a sucker. Socrates wins the exchange on points, and Book 2 opens with Glaucon complaining that the victory was rhetorical. He restates the case for injustice at full strength, with the ring of Gyges, and demands a defence of justice that ignores reputation entirely: show that the just man on the rack is happier than the unjust man honoured by everyone.

Books 2 to 4 build the city. It starts as an economy of shoemakers and farmers, acquires soldiers when it starts wanting more land, and needs an education to make those soldiers gentle to their own people and dangerous to everyone else. That education involves censoring the stories told about gods and heroes. The finished city has three classes and is held together by a noble falsehood about where its citizens came from. Justice appears as each class minding its own business, and the soul is then given three matching parts: reason, spirit and appetite.

Book 5 is interrupted. Pressed on what having things in common means, Socrates proposes that guardian women receive the same education and hold the same offices as men, that families be abolished for that class, and that children be raised without knowing their parents. Then comes the harder claim: no such city until philosophers rule.

Books 6 and 7 justify that by explaining what a philosopher knows. The sun, the divided line and the cave are three versions of one distinction between the visible and the intelligible, and above everything sits the good, which Socrates declines to define directly. The syllabus that follows runs from arithmetic to dialectic and ends around the age of fifty.

Books 8 and 9 come back down. The good city decays into rule by honour, then by wealth, then by the many, then by one man, and each regime gets a matching character type. The tyrant is shown as the least free person alive, a man enslaved by his own appetites and afraid to leave his house. Three separate arguments are then offered that the just life is more pleasant.

Book 10 renews the attack on poetry and closes with the myth of Er, in which souls between lives choose their next one and cannot blame anyone else for the choice.

How to read it

Read Book 1 as drama, not doctrine. It sets up the problem and shows you Socrates losing his temper, which is useful information.

The single most important passage for holding the book together is Glaucon’s challenge in Book 2. Everything after it is an attempt to answer a very specific question, and readers who forget the question drift into treating the city as a policy proposal.

Watch for jokes and for Socrates backing off. He calls the community of women and children a wave he may drown in. He says the good is beyond his power to describe and offers an image instead. He admits the city exists only in speech. These moves are not modesty formulas; they are where Plato marks the limits of the argument.

If you are short of time, read 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9. Book 10 is worth the extra hour for the myth alone.

The two standard misreadings are worth naming. One treats the book as Plato’s political programme, which requires ignoring how much of it Socrates disowns. The other treats it as pure irony, which requires ignoring how carefully the educational sections are worked out.

Questions it raises

  • Is justice in the soul really the same thing as justice in a city, or is the analogy doing work it cannot support?
  • Can a city founded on a deliberate falsehood about its citizens’ origins be called just?
  • Socrates gives guardian women the same education as men and abolishes their families. Is this an argument about sex or about property?
  • If the good cannot be stated, in what sense do the philosophers know it?
  • Why does a book that defends justice as its own reward end with a myth about rewards and punishments after death?
  • Is the exile of the poets a consequence of Plato’s argument, or a confession about how much power he thinks poetry has?

Highlights

  1. I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger.

    Book 1, 338c · trans. Benjamin Jowett

    Thrasymachus, giving the position the rest of the book is built to answer.

  2. Glaucon imagines a ring that makes its wearer invisible and asks whether any man, just or unjust, would keep his hands off what he wanted.

    Book 2, 359d to 360d

    Paraphrase.

  3. Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, cities will never have rest from their evils.

    Book 5, 473d · trans. Benjamin Jowett

    Socrates admits this will strike his hearers as ridiculous, and says it anyway.

  4. Prisoners are chained facing the wall of a cave, taking the shadows cast by a fire behind them for the whole of reality, and one of them is dragged out into the light.

    Book 7, 514a to 517a

    Paraphrase.

  5. The soul of a man, Socrates says, is like a many-headed beast, a lion and a human being grown together, and the just man is the one in whom the human being rules.

    Book 9, 588c to 589b

    Paraphrase.

Πολιτεία, Politeia, Republic, justice, Thrasymachus, Glaucon, Adeimantus, Cephalus, guardians, philosopher king, allegory of the cave, divided line, ring of Gyges, noble lie, tyranny, Platon, Πλάτων