Meno
by Plato · Μένων
Assigned by 5 of the 9 reading lists
The young Thessalian aristocrat Meno asks Socrates whether virtue can be taught. Socrates says he does not even know what virtue is, and the two fail to define it. When Meno objects that one cannot search for what one does not know, Socrates leads an uneducated slave boy to a geometrical truth and argues that learning is recollection of what the soul already knows. The dialogue ends by suggesting that virtue, if it is not knowledge, comes by a kind of divine gift.
We recommendFive Dialogues, translated by G. M. A. Grube, revised by John M. CooperHackett, 2002The standard translation, in a volume that pairs it with the Apology and Phaedo.
Also goodcompare
- Adam Beresford. Pairs it with the Protagoras, which asks the same question and gets a different answer.
- Dominic Scott. A full commentary rather than a reading text, for anyone writing on the recollection argument.
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- Written
- c. 385 BCE
- Language
- Greek
- Length
- Short · 40 ppunder 120 pages
- Difficulty
- Moderate2 of 5 for a first-year reader
G. M. A. Grube, revised by John M. Cooper translation
Buy on Amazon: Meno, opens in a new tabBookshop.org: Meno, opens in a new tab
Why it's on the list
This is where the theory of knowledge starts. Meno asks a practical question, can virtue be taught, and gets stuck on a logical one: how can you look for something if you do not already know what it is, and how would you know when you had found it? That is Meno's paradox, and every later account of learning has to answer it. Plato's answer, that the soul already holds what it learns and is only reminded, is almost certainly wrong and is still the most influential wrong answer in philosophy: it is the ancestor of innate ideas, of Chomsky's universal grammar, of every claim that the mind brings structure to experience rather than receiving it. Programs assign it early because it is forty pages, because the slave boy scene is the most famous demonstration in ancient philosophy, and because it makes the distinction between knowledge and true opinion that the whole shelf uses afterwards.
Key themes
- Knowledge and truth
- The dialogue separates knowing from being right. True opinion gets you to Larissa as reliably as knowledge does, but it will not stay put: knowledge is tied down by working out the reason.
- Education
- Socrates teaches the slave boy nothing and asks him everything. Whether that is a demonstration of recollection or of very good leading questions is the argument the scene is designed to start.
- Virtue and character
- Meno offers a list of virtues, then a definition, then another, and each collapses. The failure is the point: virtue turns out to be harder to state than to recognise.
- The good life
- If virtue is knowledge it can be taught, and if it can be taught there should be teachers. Socrates observes that the best Athenians conspicuously failed to pass it to their sons.
Which translation to read
For Meno the translation is most of the decision. Our pick is the G. M. A. Grube, revised by John M. Cooper translation; the others are good for different reasons.
Our pick
Five Dialogues, translated by G. M. A. Grube, revised by John M. Cooper
Hackett, 2002
The standard translation, in a volume that pairs it with the Apology and Phaedo.
Amazon: the G. M. A. Grube, revised by John M. Cooper translation, opens in a new tabBookshop.org: the G. M. A. Grube, revised by John M. Cooper translation, opens in a new tab
Also good
Protagoras and Meno, translated by Adam Beresford
Penguin Classics, 2005
Pairs it with the Protagoras, which asks the same question and gets a different answer.
Amazon: the Adam Beresford translation, opens in a new tabBookshop.org: the Adam Beresford translation, opens in a new tab
Also good
Meno, translated by Dominic Scott
Cambridge, 2006
A full commentary rather than a reading text, for anyone writing on the recollection argument.
Amazon: the Dominic Scott translation, opens in a new tabBookshop.org: the Dominic Scott translation, opens in a new tab
Overview
Forty pages, three characters, and one question that changes shape twice. Meno is a rich young Thessalian, a former student of the sophist Gorgias, and he opens the dialogue with no preliminaries at all: can virtue be taught, or is it acquired by practice, or does it come by nature? Socrates replies that he cannot say whether it can be taught because he does not know what it is.
What follows is a dialogue in three movements. First an attempt to define virtue, which fails three times. Then a crisis about whether inquiry is possible at all, answered by a geometry lesson with a slave boy. Then a return to the original question by a different route, with Anytus, one of the men who will later prosecute Socrates, arriving to be offended.
It is the most tightly built of the short dialogues and the easiest to follow, which is why it is usually read first or second.
The argument
Meno’s first answer is a list: a man’s virtue is managing the city, a woman’s is managing the house, and so on. Socrates wants the one thing they have in common, the way all bees are bees. Meno tries again: virtue is the power of ruling over people. Socrates asks whether that is virtue in a slave, or whether ruling unjustly counts. The third attempt defines virtue as desiring fine things and being able to get them, and collapses when Socrates asks whether anyone desires bad things knowingly.
At this point Meno gets annoyed and produces the paradox. You cannot look for what you do not know, because you would not recognise it if you found it; and you have no reason to look for what you already know. Inquiry is impossible either way.
Socrates answers with a demonstration rather than an argument. He calls over one of Meno’s slaves, a boy with no geometry, and asks him to double the area of a square. The boy confidently gives the wrong answer, doubling the side. Socrates shows him the result is four times too big, and the boy discovers he does not know. Then, by questions alone, he is brought to see that the correct side is the diagonal of the original square. Socrates claims he taught nothing and only asked, so the knowledge must have been in the boy, recollected rather than acquired. The soul is immortal and has learned everything already.
The last third returns to teachability. If virtue is knowledge it can be taught; if it can be taught, there are teachers. Socrates asks Anytus who the teachers of virtue are. Anytus will not say the sophists, and Socrates observes that Athens’ best men, Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, gave their sons riding lessons and no virtue at all. Anytus leaves with a threat. The dialogue closes on a compromise: statesmen may guide the city rightly by true opinion, the way a soothsayer speaks truly without understanding, and virtue may come to them as a gift from the gods, since it is plainly not being taught. Socrates adds that none of this is settled until we know what virtue is.
How to read it
Read it in one sitting. It is short enough and the argument is continuous; breaking it up loses the momentum from definition to crisis to demonstration.
Do the geometry. Draw the square, draw the doubled side, see that it gives four times the area, then draw the diagonal. The scene is unreadable as prose and obvious as a picture, and if you do not work it through you will not be able to say what Socrates actually proved.
Watch the questions in that scene closely, because this is where the argument is won or lost. Count how many are genuinely open and how many contain their own answer. Socrates claims he only asked. Decide whether you believe him. Most readers conclude the boy is being led, and the interesting question then becomes what that shows: perhaps not that the soul remembers, but that a person can be brought to see a necessary truth by their own reasoning, which is a weaker and more defensible claim.
Notice the two questions are not the same. “Can virtue be taught” is about pedagogy; “what is virtue” is about definition. Socrates insists the second must come first, and the dialogue is partly an argument for that priority.
The common misreading is that the recollection theory is the dialogue’s conclusion. It is offered as a reason not to give up, explicitly as something Socrates would fight for less than he would fight for the claim that we are better off searching than assuming we cannot.
Keep an eye on Anytus. Plato’s readers knew what he did next, and the scene is written so that the man who cannot name a teacher of virtue is the man who will kill the one person in the room asking about it.
Questions it raises
- Does the slave boy learn geometry, or remember it? What would distinguish the two from the outside?
- Meno’s paradox assumes knowing is all-or-nothing. Is there a state between knowing and not knowing that dissolves the problem?
- Socrates says true opinion is as useful as knowledge for getting to Larissa. If the practical results are identical, what is knowledge for?
- If virtue cannot be taught and comes by divine gift, what follows for education, and for holding people responsible?
- The definitions of virtue fail because they list parts or import virtue into the definition. Is a single definition the right thing to be looking for?
- Anytus is offended by a true observation about Athenian fathers. What does the dialogue suggest about the cost of asking this question in public?
Highlights
A man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know. He cannot search for what he knows, since he knows it, and in that case is in no need of searching; nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for.
Meno's paradox, as Socrates restates it.
For seeking and learning are in fact nothing but recollection.
True opinions are a fine thing and do all sorts of good so long as they stay in their place, but they will not stay long. They run away from a man's mind; so they are not worth much until you tether them by working out the reason.

