Supreme Court Opinions

Overview

About two hundred pages, a short reader of early American judicial opinions, spanning 1803 to 1857, usually assigned with section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In Marbury v. Madison of 1803, Chief Justice Marshall holds that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void and that it is for the courts to say so, while declining the jurisdiction Congress had tried to give the Court.

Justice Gibson’s dissent in Eakin v. Raub, a Pennsylvania case of 1825, argues the other side, that the legislature answers to the people rather than to judges. In Dred Scott v. Sandford of 1857, Chief Justice Taney holds that a Black American cannot be a citizen and that Congress cannot bar slavery from the territories; Justice Curtis dissents.

What happens

Marbury’s jurisdictional claim. William Marbury sues to receive his commission as justice of the peace, bringing before the Supreme Court the jurisdictional question that will produce Marshall’s foundational constitutional ruling.

Marshall establishes judicial review. Chief Justice Marshall holds that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void and that it is for the courts to say so, establishing judicial review as a fundamental American constitutional practice.

Marshall declines jurisdiction. Marshall simultaneously declines the specific jurisdiction Congress had tried to give the Court, a strategic calculation asserting considerable new judicial power while avoiding direct confrontation with the executive branch.

Gibson’s dissenting counterargument. In the later Pennsylvania case Eakin v. Raub, Justice Gibson dissents from judicial review itself, arguing the legislature answers to the people rather than to judges, preserving genuine contemporary counterargument.

Taney’s Dred Scott holding. Chief Justice Taney holds in Dred Scott v. Sandford that a Black American cannot be a citizen and that Congress cannot bar slavery from the territories, deploying judicial power toward entrenching profound injustice.

Curtis’s dissent. Justice Curtis dissents from Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott, preserving within the same case a contemporary judicial voice explicitly rejecting the majority’s morally catastrophic constitutional reasoning.

How to read it

Read Marshall’s holding in Marbury v. Madison as establishing judicial review with unusually careful strategic calculation, asserting this considerable new judicial power precisely while declining jurisdiction, avoiding direct confrontation with the executive.

Pay close attention to Justice Gibson’s dissent in Eakin v. Raub, arguing the legislature answers to the people rather than to judges; this preserves the genuine counterargument against judicial review, demonstrating this practice was neither obvious nor uncontested.

Notice how Chief Justice Taney’s holding in Dred Scott represents American constitutional law’s single most morally catastrophic judicial decision, judicial review’s considerable power deployed toward entrenching rather than checking a profound injustice.

Consider how reading Marbury alongside Dred Scott together demonstrates judicial review’s genuine moral neutrality as institutional mechanism, the same considerable power capable of either constraining or actively worsening injustice depending on the judges wielding it.

Read these opinions alongside the Federalist Papers to see how the constitutional structure Hamilton, Madison and Jay defended in theory produced, in actual judicial practice, both Marshall’s foundational restraint and Taney’s later catastrophic misuse of the same institutional authority.

Questions it raises

• Does Marshall’s strategic combination of claiming judicial review while declining jurisdiction in Marbury represent admirable institutional caution, or does this calculated approach itself raise questions about whether courts should assert sweeping new powers through such careful political maneuvering?
• How persuasive is Justice Gibson’s dissenting argument that the legislature answers to the people rather than to judges? Does this counterargument against judicial review retain force today, or has subsequent constitutional practice settled this question in Marshall’s favor?
• What does Dred Scott’s catastrophic holding reveal about judicial review’s actual moral character as institutional mechanism? Does this case demonstrate that judicial power requires additional checks beyond simply trusting judges to exercise it wisely?
• How should a reader weigh Curtis’s dissent in Dred Scott against the majority opinion’s actual legal and political consequences? Does preserving this dissenting voice adequately counter the damage the majority holding caused, or does dissent alone prove insufficient?
• Given that these three opinions span over five decades of early American constitutional development, what does this range suggest about judicial review’s uneven, non-linear development, from foundational establishment through genuine contestation to catastrophic misapplication?
• What does this collection’s continued use in teaching American constitutional law suggest about the value of studying both successful and catastrophic exercises of the same judicial power? Does understanding Dred Scott alongside Marbury better illuminate judicial review’s actual risks and responsibilities?